Norway, the Joint Strike Fighter Program and its Implications for Transatlantic Defense Industrial Cooperation by Neubauer, Sigurd & Weltzien, Åsmund
1Policy Brief
Norway, the Joint Strike Fighter Program 
and its Implications for Transatlantic 
Defense Industrial Cooperation  
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On September 22, 2015, Norwegian Defense Minister Ine Erik-
sen Søreide welcomed the rollout of the first Norwegian Joint 
Strike Fighter jet (JSF), also known as the F-35, at a Lockheed 
Martin production facility in Fort Worth, Texas. Expressing sat-
isfaction with “this extremely important acquisition,” Søreide 
announced that the F-35 would replace the government’s cur-
rent fleet of F-16 fighters.1 As part of that effort, Norway has 
so far committed itself to purchasing 22 JSF jets out of a total 
requirement of 52, which together with the necessary sup-
port equipment and training is estimated to cost 67.9 billion 
Norwegian kroner ($7.94 billion). The Norwegian Parliament, 
however, will reassess the requirement for the six last jets 
once 46 F-35s have been ordered.  The first F-35 deliveries to 
Norway are expected in 2015 for training at the Partner Train-
ing Center at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona, with the first air-
craft arriving in Norway in 2017. Deliveries are expected to be 
completed by 2024, with initial operating capability in 2019 
and Full Operating Capability in 2025. Norway also intends to 
maintain four F-35s at Luke Air Force Base to train pilots; the 
remaining 48 jets will be stationed in Norway.
The F-35 program is a unique historic opportunity for 
Washington’s international allies to participate in its largest 
defense procurement program of all times. That being said, it 
appears increasingly unlikely that a similar program on this 
scale and magnitude will appear again. 
 
Largest Defense Acquisition Program in Pentagon 
History
Norway, along with Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Nether-
lands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, is participating in the 
largest US weapons acquisition program in Pentagon history.  
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1 “Norway’s First F-35 Rolled Out,” Norwegian Embassy in Washington, DC, 
22 September 2015 Available online at: http://www.norway.org/News_
and_events/Embassy/Norways-First-F-35-Rolled-Out/#.VjtM04vIbzI 
Not surprisingly, the biggest purchaser is the United States which 
aims to acquire a total of 2,443 jets of all variants for its Air Force, 
Navy and Marines. The United Kingdom plans to purchase 138 
jets; Australia, 100; Canada, 100; Turkey, 100; Italy, 90; Neth-
erlands, 37; and Denmark 30.  However, Canada and Denmark 
have yet to finalize their plans.
Under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, Japan, South 
Korea, and Israel will have the opportunity to purchase JSF jets, 
but not to help shape the program or influence its technological 
makeup by bidding for potentially lucrative subcontracts. Japan 
has committed to a procurement of 42; South Korea 40; and 
Israel 33 aircrafts. Singapore and Belgium have also expressed 
interest in acquiring JSF jets through the FMS program. 
Competition from Rafale?
Should the JSF program succeed with significantly reducing 
the aircraft’s lifespan costs, additional orders through the FMS 
program by Washington’s remaining NATO allies could increase 
over time. The JSF has for all practical purposes established itself 
as a monopoly program that cannot be easily challenged, even 
by France’s Rafale program. Indeed, the Rafale jet can hardly be 
considered a competitor, as NATO allies have come to rely on US 
system integration and shared technologies to carry out increas-
ingly complex joint operations under a US command structure. 
Thus, as the JSF program advances, smaller NATO members with 
limited capabilities are increasingly likely to opt for JSF jets to 
upgrade their capabilities within the alliances instead of select-
ing the Rafale, even if it is projected to be slightly less costly. 
As part of a bargaining strategy to obtain cheaper F-35s, NATO 
members that have not yet signed onto the US FMS program may 
publicly choose to explore bids for Rafale contracts; Singapore 
and India may adopt this approach as well. 
Adding to the JSF program’s attractiveness is the fact that each inter-
national partner will receive nearly the same capabilities within its 
aircrafts as the US version. Apparently, the only difference between 
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the US and the international version is that the software on a US 
F-35 has a newer computer. Further, the JSF program has been 
so designed that only the partners in the program can have an 
influence on the process: those participating through the FMS 
program may request what should be in the plane, but will not 
have a say on the technologies to be included.2 
As the JSF program moves forward, it is likely to face domestic 
political hurdles within the various partner countries, includ-
ing in the US, with critics questioning the overall affordability 
of the F-35, and whether Lockheed will be able to reduce costs 
per aircraft. Canada’s recent political upset has added renewed 
uncertainty about the program’s affordability, should the new 
government in Ottawa decide to pull out. A decision by Can-
ada or any other country to cancel orders of the JSF would add 
some $1 million to the cost of each plane purchased by the US 
military or other partners, according to the senior U.S. govern-
ment official in charge of the program, Lt. Gen. Chris Bogdan.3 
It should be noted, however, that domestic politics within the 
various partner countries concerning the JSF program can also 
serve as an important bargaining chip for these governments 
to push prices down for the partnership as a whole. While the 
partnership model means that individual partner nations are 
unable to negotiate individual pricing agreements for their 
respective aircrafts, as the base price is the same for all partner 
nations for the same aircraft configuration in each production 
series, uncertainty about partner commitments may be used 
by Bogdan in negotiations with Lockheed Martin and Pratt 
& Whitney for the airframe and the engine respectively as 
an argument to achieve additional cost reductions. Also, the 
various countries may use such uncertainty to gain preference 
in terms of industrial participation, either directly related to 
the F-35 or more generally through their bilateral relationship 
with the United States.4 
Big Business for Norway
Early industry estimates indicate that Lockheed’s multi-service 
JSF contract could have a potential value of over $200 billion 
depending on the number of planes built over the program’s 
lifespan.5 During the Concept Development Phase, from 1997 
to 2001, the Pentagon invited other governments to seek par-
ticipation in the program. Under the program, international 
partners would be granted the opportunity to influence the 
development and production of the most advanced aircraft the 
US had ever produced. In the late 1990s, Washington feared 
that Europe “would keep American defence firms and their 
weapons out of the market that provided the strongest impetus 
for international collaboration on the Joint Strike Programme,” 
Ethan Kapstein of Arizona State University argued in an article 
published in Survival in 2004.6 In addition to winning market 
shares while taking on competition presented by the multina-
tional Eurofighter Program, the Rafale and Gripen, Washing-
ton sought through the JSF program to protect the US defense 
industrial base. Politically, the JSF also promised to create thou-
sands of jobs within the US and for its national partners, while 
allowing for the transfer of highly advanced technologies to its 
international allies. Consistent with that vision, under the JSF 
program, factories will be built in Italy, Turkey and in Japan, 
Bogdan announced in an interview with the Joint Force Quar-
terly in May 2015. Factories will be built in Italy and in Japan 
to assemble and check out F-35s; for engines, maintenance 
and overhaul facilities will initially be built in Turkey and in 
Japan; and later in the Netherlands and Norway. For Norway’s 
part, state-owned enterprise AIM Norway has qualified as a 
potential future provider of engine maintenance services “on 
several hundred” engines for the F-35 beyond 2050.7 “We are 
also building a supply, repair, and heavy maintenance capabil-
ity in both Europe and the Pacific regions—just like the one we 
are building here in North America,” Bogdan explained.8  
For Norway, along with its international partners, the pro-
gram has enabled it to bid for subcontracts and to ultimately 
buy the finished product. In addition to its deliveries to the 
production of the F-35, Kongsberg Defense and Aerospace is 
also developing the Joint Strike Missile (JSM) under a contract 
from the Norwegian government; and while it is initially being 
developed to satisfy Norwegian operational requirements, it 
will also become part of the potential weapons fit for all A, and 
C-variants of the F-35.9 Once the 3,000 aircrafts intended for 
customers worldwide have been completed, Norway, through 
its consortium of defense industry ventures, is expected to 
have recovered the value of the aircraft themselves within its 
staggering multi-billion dollar investment in the JSF program. 
As yet, however, no JSF partner has purchased or ordered the 
JSM, although Australia has agreed to contribute to the devel-
opment of the missile, providing additional capability and 
thereby market potential beyond what is already funded by the 
Norwegian government.10 
Why Norway Looks to Washington for Defense Industry 
Cooperation
While Norway’s participation in the program continues to 
enjoy broad-based political support, critics have argued that 
the JSF is too expensive, and that the country’s defense needs 
would be better served by partnering with Sweden’s aerospace 
giant, Saab, which has developed its own fighter jet program, 
the JSA 39 Gripen. In the end, Norway chose to purchase the 
JSF, after Lockheed beat off competition from Saab.
As a founding member of NATO, Norway has retained the 
US as its principal strategic ally. It was not surprising that 
Norway chose to partner with Washington and not neighbor-
 7 “AIM Norway to maintain F-35-engines”, Norwegian Ministry of Defense, 
November 12, 2014.
 8 W. Eliason, “An Interview with Christopher C. Bogdan”, Joint Force Quar-
terly, May 12, 2015.
 9 Interview with senior Norwegian Defense Ministry official,  November 5, 
2015.
10 L. Selligman, “Norway, Australia Team To Upgrade Missile for F-35”, De-
fense News, September 21, 2015.
2 This according to multiple sources familiar with the program.
3 “Pentagon says F-35 jet cost to rise if Canada, others skip orders”, Reuters, 
21 October 2015.*
4 Interview with senior Norwegian Defense Ministry official, 5 November, 
2015.
5 E. Kapstein, “Capturing Fortress Europe: International Collaboration and 
the Joint Strike Fighter”, Survival, vol. 46, no. 3, Autumn 2004.
6 Ibid.
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ing Sweden, when it came to developing the next generation 
stealth fighter jet, as the program aims to transform the vari-
ous partners’ collective weapon systems into a unified force 
that can help protect NATO’s technological superiority well 
into the 21st century and beyond.
For Norway, participating in the JSF program has also offered 
strategic opportunities for its small but competitive defense 
industry, as Oslo aims to strengthen US market access for its 
indigenously developed military technologies. Norway also 
recognizes that its defense industrial base cannot survive 
without an export-oriented market approach.
Program Challenges
Since Lockheed won the JSF contract in 2001, following five 
years of competition, the program has suffered numerous 
production and manufacturing delays, including booming 
costs, which at several points brought the long-term viabil-
ity of the program into question. Naturally enough, such 
delays and development challenges have generated consid-
erable criticism. Critics continue to argue that the program 
is over budget, behind schedule and its jets are inferior to 
existing planes; some are even calling for it to be cancelled 
altogether. While the program has indeed had its problems, 
it now appears to be on a positive trajectory, as unit prices are 
dropping and the JSF is meeting cost and schedule targets set 
in 2012. “We believe that we’re going to finish the develop-
ment program without asking for any more money,” Bogdan 
said in May 2015. He also expressed confidence that the 
trend of reducing the cost per aircraft would continue as the 
program accelerated.11  Currently, more than 160 jets have 
been produced, and annual deliveries are expected to grow 
significantly over the coming years. By 2018, several hun-
dred additional aircrafts will have been delivered, Defense 
News reported in September 2015.12 
 
Commenting on the various challenges, Andrew Hunter of 
the Center for Strategic International Studies in Washington 
DC explained that while F-35 production began in 2008, it 
was not until 2015 that it was approaching what could be 
termed a finished development. “The exceptionally long 
process can partly be explained by the US government and 
Lockheed’s excessive optimism that the aircraft with its 
advanced technological capabilities could be produced in 
a relatively short period of time,” Hunter said.13  This came 
as the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) released 
a report in April 2015, announcing that the Pentagon “plans 
to significantly increase annual F-35 funding from around $8 
billion to nearly $12 billion over the next 5 years reaching 
$14 billion in 2022 and remaining between $14 and $15 bil-
lion for nearly a decade” as part of an effort to reduce costs 
and enhance affordability.14 
With the US government’s massive orders for F-35s as well as 
the program’s export-oriented nature, proponents believe that 
this will help lower costs per aircraft even further in the coming 
years. Consequently, the Pentagon is currently planning for a 
significant ramp-up of the F-35. The Pentagon is also seeking 
to reduce costs by maintaining a high production rate through 
its “block buy” policy, aimed at securing a multi-year produc-
tion contract. As of this writing (November 2015),  no decision 
has yet been made by the Pentagon on whether to include a 
block buy provision in its budget request for next year.
Meanwhile, Lockheed has announced its own cost reduction 
measures, with the goal of reducing the average cost per F-35 
even more than the current estimates to about $80 million 
for each aircraft. Lockheed’s objective appears to be consist-
ent with the Pentagon’s projection that by 2019, the price per 
aircraft could be between $80 and $85 million.15 At present, 
each F-35 costs more than $100 million, though this is at a 
significantly lower annual production volume, which has 
remained at around 35 aircraft annually for several years.16 
Lockheed contends that more efficient manufacturing meth-
ods will help it drive down the flyaway cost of the fifth-gen-
eration fighter by $10 million by 2019, and even more if the 
US government invests.17 Maintenance and operational costs 
of the F-35 are also coming down, according to Bogdan, who 
projects that these will be within 10 percent of the F-16.18 
However, further details regarding possible fuel efficiency 
and maintenance costs are hard to specify, as they build 
on a classified Pentagon report apparently conducted a few 
years ago. It should also be noted that independent figures 
concerning cost-reduction measures are nearly impossible 
to obtain, as the only available data have been provided by 
Lockheed, its consortium of international subcontractors 
and the participating governments. Given these factors, it 
remains unclear what the actual lifespan costs per aircraft 
will be for this highly complex program. 
Nonetheless, with its cost-saving measures and the US govern-
ment’s planned block purchases, the JSF program is slowly but 
surely maturing; despite the initial challenges, the program 
appears to be turning into a success. As with other large-scale 
US defense procurement programs, the longer the JSF program 
prevails, the stronger are its chances for success, according to 
Jonathan D. Caverley of the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy. Further, he noted, as the program develops and technologi-
cal challenges are dealt with while new capabilities are added 
to the F-35, only a “catastrophic” event could topple the pro-
gram, since the number of uncertainties continues to decline.19 
Still, as the JSF has some monopolistic products, Lockheed’s 
consortium of subcontractors are trying to negotiate to receive 
parts of the surplus, which inevitably pushes up prices. 
11 Ibid.
12 “Vago’s Notebook: F-35 Progress”, Defense News, September  13,  2015.
13 Interview with Andrew Hunter, Director, Defense-Industrial Initiatives 
Group and Senior Fellow, International Security Program, Center for Stra-
tegic International Studies, September 17, 2015.
14 “Assessment Needed to Address Affordability Challenges”, U.S. Govern-
ment Accountability Office, GAO-15-364, April 14, 2015.
15 S. Kaskovich and Y. Berard, “Lockheed, partners pledge to pump $170 mil-
lion into F-35”, Fort Worth Star Telegram, July 10, 2014.
16 Interview with senior Norwegian Defense Ministry official, November 5, 
2015.
17  B. Carey, “Lockheed Martin Follows ‘Blueprint’ To Drive Down F-35 Costs,” 
AIN Online, June 12, 2015.
18 Eliason, op.cit.
19 Interview with Jonathan D. Caverley, Research Associate, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, October 20, 2015.
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Under the F-35 monopoly, Lockheed’s subcontractors do not 
have to worry about losing customers to competitors: they can 
set monopoly prices that are significantly higher than their 
marginal costs, allowing them an economic profit larger than 
the normal profit typical of a perfectly competitive industry. 
“By investing all eggs in one basket,” Lockheed and its sub-
contractors are expected to increase profits from a massive 
economy of scale factor, should the program expand produc-
tion from 3,000 to 4,000 or 5,000 aircraft, Caverley said.20 
While Lockheed anticipates that development will be com-
pleted by the end of 2017, its international partners have 
begun discussions about the program’s “Block 4” aspect, 
which in addition to providing overall modernization of the 
aircraft and its associated systems will allow for the incorpo-
ration of partner weapons and technologies into the aircraft. 
It is under Block 4 that the Joint Strike Missile (JSM) will be 
developed by Kongsberg. During this process, there may, 
however, be some “foreign disappointments,” said Hunter of 
CSIS, explaining that this could be because not all projects 
could be implemented into the program. But foreign prod-
ucts could be implemented at own expense, he added.21 
Conclusions
Despite clear indications that the JSF program has become 
a success story for transatlantic defense industry coop-
eration, thanks to its ability to address technical challenges 
while maintaining its international coalition intact, it seems 
increasingly unlikely that a similar program on this scale 
and magnitude will come again in the foreseeable future, if 
ever. When Washington announced that it would produce 
3000 F-35s, along with its invitation to international allies to 
participate in its largest-ever defense procurement program, 
this presented allies with a unique historic opportunity that 
combined commerce, joint R&D, and US technology sharing 
while also enabling them to obtain the most advanced air-
craft the United States had ever produced.
When it comes to other defense products – whether anti-
missile systems or contracts for producing combat vehicles – a 
competitive international market is already in place, with the 
US struggling to maintain its Qualitative Military Edge. Given 
current technological developments, private-sector industry 
is becoming increasingly important, particularly in the digital 
sphere. Many dual-use technologies have been developed by 
US private-sector companies, not by Washington’s defense 
industrial complex. Further, many of the US-developed tech-
nologies available in the commercial marketplace can be 
adopted for military purposes – which China, Russia, Iran and 
North Korea have already taken advantage of. Moreover, the US 
defense industry consistently faces large-scale industrial espi-
onage through successive cyberattacks from China and Russia. 
Within this context, the JSF is a unique program that builds 
on Washington’s clear air superiority. As to other defense 
industry products, the marketplace is becoming increas-
ingly competitive, with China and Russia developing their 
own capabilities that are slowly but surely rivaling Western 
military superiority. Given this trend and the economy of 
scale, it does not seem likely that Washington will engage 
again in a multinational joint industrial venture to produce 
weaponry or platforms like submarines, ships, and tanks, let 
alone smaller products. Instead, the United States is likely 
to strengthen its own capabilities by focusing on upgrading 
defense systems – as opposed to focusing on further tech-
nology sharing with key allies, which could add additional 
vulnerabilities to its critical infrastructure.  
20 Interview with Jonathan D. Caverley, Research Associate, Massachusetts 
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21 Interview with Andrew Hunter, Director, Defense-Industrial Initiatives 
Group and Senior Fellow, International Security Program, Center for Stra-
tegic International Studies, September 17, 2015.
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